Brandan P. Buck
President Trump was elected in 2024 partly on his promise of ending “America’s endless wars.” The Trump administration says it doesn’t want new wars, boldly declaring that “[w]e will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into.” While it is too early to judge his sincerity or ability to do so, in the early weeks of his second term it appears like the Trump administration is poised to breathe new life into America’s original “endless war,” that of the war on drugs.
The Trump administration has repeatedly floated the idea of using unilateral military force in Mexico, specifically launching Special Operations Forces (SOF) raids and airstrikes at the drug cartels. Framing the emerging sentiment was Tom Homan, who, during an appearance on Fox News, asserted that President Trump was prepared to “use [the] full might of the United States special operations to take ‘em out.”
Elon Musk, who opined on X, added to the overheated rhetoric: “I doubt the cartels can be defeated without US Special Operations.” American venture capitalist and Palantir Technologies founder Joe Lonsdale confidently declared on X that “the same US tech & expertise that eliminated thousands of terrorists could overcome cartels and their allies in the Mexican government, root out the fraud and corruption, and eliminate the criminals.”
Adding to the drumbeat, Heritage Foundation scholars Robert Greenway, Andrés Martínez-Fernández, and Wilson Beaver have authored a paper titled “How the President Can Use the U.S. Military to Secure the Border With Mexico.” Among the issues covered in the report was the possibility of using US military force in Mexico, which its authors argue “may be necessary to prompt cooperation from a resistant Mexican government or otherwise contain the cartel threat.”
The authors are more sensitive to the risks of unilateral military force and do not display the unmoored confidence of some proponents, recommending US-Mexico joint action instead. Still, they nevertheless underestimate the tradeoffs that would emerge should the US commit troops to a cross-border war with the Mexican drug cartels.
To their credit, the authors list numerous perils of unilateral military intervention in Mexico so thoroughly that one wonders how they can sustain their argument. First among the many problems is the lack of actionable intelligence on cartel members and their supply networks. Relatedly, they note that the nature of fentanyl production, unlike other drugs, presents a small visual signature, thereby impeding intelligence gathering. They also concede that actionable intelligence in Mexico is further hampered by corruption in the Mexican government. They note such labs are often located in crowded urban centers, so strikes against them would result in high civilian casualties. They cite that the cartels are estimated to hold approximately 160,000–185,000 well-armed members. They note that the cartel networks have so far withstood the “disruptive effect” of network degradation through the killing of high-profile members and that the cartels have “proven in the past their ability to restructure after fragmentation.”
Perhaps most chillingly, they note the prospects of cartel reprisals against American citizens and businesses in Mexico and the United States. Finally, they admit that prolonged border militarization, much less a cross-border incursion, would risk other American strategic interests. Ultimately, the authors make a strong case against using unilateral military force in Mexico.
The authors argue that the United States government needs to plan and prepare for such an intervention anyway. This case, despite all the downsides, rests on a belief that the use of unilateral military action against the cartels could “be enough to galvanize the Mexican government into cooperation with the U.S.” Furthermore, they assert that even on its own, a unilateral American military force could inhibit supply chains, impede cartel networks, and create “deleterious, if temporary, effects on cartel trafficking activity and networks.”
The Heritage report is an exercise in contradiction and wish casting. As noted earlier, the authors rightly observe that fentanyl labs are smaller, more difficult to detect, and easier to replace than conventional drug production. Nevertheless, its authors conclude that “with sufficient intelligence and coordinated measures, the potential exists for well-targeted actions to disrupt more vulnerable links in fentanyl supply chains.” How will American technical and human intelligence assets overcome these hurdles? Furthermore, if even tactically successful, how will the degradation of the cartel networks occur fast enough to constitute a strategic success? We do not know because the authors do not tell us.
For the scrupulous reader, one is left to ponder how the US government will succeed where the Mexican government has failed. The authors assure us that the answer lies in heeding the “lessons learned from the experiences of the past failures by the Mexican government to defeat the cartels.” Those lessons, apparently, call for more of the same, like “targeting vulnerable links” in cartel supply chains and “kinetic action” [i.e., killing] of cartel leadership. If insanity is doing the same thing twice and expecting a different result, their proposal certainly qualifies. We should demand a higher bar for supporting new wars than waving off serious objections and engaging in sublime wishful thinking.
The authors’ geopolitical arguments are similarly lacking. Their claim that American military power might force the Mexican government into cooperation neglects the enduring pull of Mexican nationalism and latent anti-American sentiment. On this point, the report’s one historical example, the Pancho Villa Expedition, which they cite positively, is terrible. That expedition failed in its objective of capturing its intended target and significantly damaged bilateral relations for a generation. Rather than serving as a model, the expedition should serve as a warning.
Furthermore, the authors fail to consider the potential diplomatic fallout of damaging relations like undermining cooperation on illegal migration, countering Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere, and, if recent interventions into the Middle East are any guide, causing an uptick in war-related displacement. Their consolation prize, that unilateral force against the cartels would yield results that would offset damaged relations, similarly rests on a faulty assumption of success.
Rather, in a reality plagued by the numerous quagmires of the Global War on Terror, a long-term military campaign in Mexico would be as politically and logistically challenging, especially if Mexico resists or if cartel violence escalates in response.
While the Heritage Foundation report thankfully lacks the hubris and bravado of some administration officials and surrogates who have, in recent months, championed this cause, it nevertheless fails to account for the diplomatic fallout and possibility for strategic failure that would likely accompany US military action in Mexico. Despite the authors’ awareness of the pitfalls of such an endeavor, they nevertheless fail to account for how the US government would succeed where the Mexican government has failed. Furthermore, its authors pile numerous analytical leaps atop one another, positing that military success, itself an assumption, would outweigh whatever diplomatic fallout may occur.
A more sober-minded analysis holds that neither is guaranteed. While the US is undoubtedly suffering through the misery of the fentanyl epidemic and Mexico is enduring the related horror of cartel violence, solutions to both must be based on sound reasoning. Possible solutions should not incur tradeoffs as damaging as the issues they are meant to solve. Heritage’s analysis of the problem, like the braggadocio emanating from some corners of the Trump administration, does neither.