Jon Hoffman
Summary: The ongoing co-option of Islam as a religio-political tool by authoritarian Middle East regimes is applauded by Western governments, who fail to see that such an approach ensures ongoing instability rather than the security it promises to deliver.
Islam continues to play an important role in Middle East politics. But how has this changed given the ever-evolving nature of the region’s political landscape? In particular, how have competitions for religio-political authority in the Middle East changed since the 2011 Arab uprisings, given the existential threat this wave of mass mobilization posed to ruling elites in the region? How have these competitions manifested in the Middle East amid the various regional upheavals since? These questions form the foundation of my new book, Islam and Statecraft: Religious Soft Power in the Arab Gulf States.
Competition for religio-political authority is nothing new in Islam or the Middle East. In fact, the struggle for religio-political authority in the “new” Middle East looks a lot like competition for the same in the “old” Middle East.
Struggles for religio-political authority in Islam are almost as old as the religion itself. This is due, in large part, to the fact that both historically and doctrinally, Islam is a varied and diverse tradition, with many different competing claims to authority.
Debates within Islam regarding governance and legitimate authority have always been more political than religious in nature due to the fact that the Quran did not specify a particular form of government. This struggle for religious authority has considerable political ramifications and is a coveted resource.
State authorities have routinely asserted themselves in such competitions, attempting to establish greater hegemony over Islamic discourse and interpretation. Even nominally secular states in the Middle East insert themselves in such competitions to control the politicization of religion. Efforts by the state to control Islam have increased incrementally in the 14 years since the Arab uprisings as Middle East governments fear for their own authority and legitimacy.
States across the Middle East continue to utilise Islam as a form of statecraft. The varying ways in which states use religion are largely dependent on the context they are operating in and the audience they are trying to influence. This is particularly the case in the Gulf, where there is an intimate relationship between Islam and politics in the powerful monarchial states that inhabit the Arabian Peninsula. There has also been a more general shift in the regional balance of power in the Middle East toward the Gulf in recent decades, with several asserting themselves both regionally and globally as major political players.
Islam has played an important role in these regional and global contests for power. A relatively new and particularly lucrative strategy is the Saudi-UAE-led government-sponsored project of so-called “moderate Islam.” The project promotes a politically quietist and statist conceptualisation of Islam—one that stresses absolute obedience to established authority. It renders religion subservient to the state while delegitimising alternative sources of religio-political authority. This is often coupled with the strategic usage of interfaith tolerance—namely as a way to whitewash the regimes’ destabilising policies, present themselves as the sole legitimate representatives of the global Muslim community, and to curry favour with influential actors in certain key countries.
The West has embraced this project of “moderate Islam.” When engaging with its Western allies, political elites in the Middle East—who have a vested interest in the sustainment of the undemocratic status quo—lean heavily into the orientalist trope that the people of the Middle East are not “ready” for democracy, or that Islam is not “compatible” with a democratic system of governance. This form of “reverse orientalism” is meant to appeal to Western policymakers by presenting the region’s autocratic governments as the best guarantors of “stability” and the actors most capable of advancing the interests of Western political elites in the region.
By keeping conversations centered around the supposed “deficiencies” of the people of the Middle East or Islam, these autocrats are able to deflect attention from how their authoritarian policies are often the underlying catalysts for regional instability while sustaining Western support for their own authority and painting any change to the prevailing status quo as “extreme.”
However, the state is not alone in the contest for religio-political authority. It operates within a broader matrix of other actors at the sub-state, non-state, and transnational levels, which can all serve to influence the foreign policy decision-making process and challenge the state’s attempted monopoly on religion. Such actors challenge the state’s efforts to establish a monopoly on religion.
One recent example is Syria. The downfall of Bashar al-Assad last December and the rise to power of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) demonstrate the continued relevance of Islamist groups in the Middle East. Elsewhere in the region, more mainstream Islamist groups have been fiercely repressed over the past decade—driving many of them underground—but they remain resilient. Perhaps the greatest lesson Syria offers is that the grievances at the heart of the Arab uprisings have not disappeared. Across the Middle East, they have grown considerably worse. Islamism—both mainstream and radical—will remain a medium through which to challenge the status quo.
Another example is Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza, which was launched in retaliation for Hamas’ 7 October attack against Israel. The past 16 months have shown how interconnected the Middle East remains, with the war in Gaza sparking a wave of regional escalation. Islamist actors of all stripes have been vocal in expressing solidarity with the Palestinians while denouncing Israel’s behaviour.
Moreover, Washington’s decision to bankroll Israel’s war has generated tremendous outrage toward the United States and its Western allies throughout not only the Middle East but the broader Muslim community. As my colleague Mustafa Akyol correctly argues, this undermines more liberal and reform-minded voices within Islam and fuels hardliners who use Western hypocrisy and indifference to the region’s suffering to promote extremist ideologies.
As popular discontent across the region grows and the likelihood of unrest increases, it can be expected that the strategic wielding of religion will continue to play an important role in Middle East politics.
This article was originally published in Arab Digest.